

*Civil-Military Coordination
in United Nations and African Peace Operations*

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UN Complex Peace Operations

WHY IS THIS CHAPTER IMPORTANT?

United Nations peace operations are the most prevalent form of peace operations in Africa. African CIMIC Officers are likely to serve either in a UN peace operation, or alongside a UN peace operation, and it is thus important to understand how these operations are mandated and organised, and how they function. The aim of this chapter is to place CIMIC in the UN complex peace operations environment.

WHAT IS COVERED?

This chapter will provide a brief overview of how peace operations have changed and developed over the last 50 years, since the UN deployed its first peace operations mission. It will describe the legal basis for peace operations within the United Nations Charter. It will then give a brief overview of the development of peace operations from classical peace operations to complex peace operations.

Complex peace operations, with the use of a contemporary case study, will be discussed in greater detail, with a view to exploring the complexity inherent in this multifunctional and multidimensional activity, and the need for an integrated or holistic mission approach.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The UN Charter does not provide a definition for peace operations, nor does it provide guidelines for when peace operations should be established. Peace operations came about as a result of the foresight and creative interpretation of the UN Charter by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld. Pearson was the Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN, and Hammarskjöld the UN Secretary-General at the time when peace operations were first conceived and implemented in 1949.

PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations take place when the United Nations or others bodies are authorised to deploy military, civilian and police personnel to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement or ceasefire. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force.

Peace operations of this kind are normally associated with UN Security Council authorisation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, entitled 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes'. The UN Agenda for Peace (UN:1992) defines peace operations as a 'field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties to monitor and facilitate the implementation of ceasefires, separation of forces or other peace agreements.'

The authority of the United Nations as the international body responsible for global peace and security derives from Article 1(1) of the UN Charter. It states that the purpose of the UN is:

... to maintain international peace and security and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. (Similar to 'Preventive Diplomacy'.)

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement usually occurs in a hostile environment where consent is absent, but where the UN Security Council, often based on humanitarian considerations, authorises the use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally-sanctioned resolutions or agreements. Peace enforcement is normally associated with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, entitled 'Acts with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. The most important factor in both peace operations and peace enforcement is the impartiality of the peacekeepers. (See also 'Enforcement' and 'Peace operations'.)

Chapter VI of the UN Charter is entitled 'The Pacific Settlement of Disputes'. In Article 33, the Charter obliges:

'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'

Although Chapter VI does not specifically refer to the deployment of troops to monitor or supervise ceasefires or peace agreements, most of these kinds of peace operation missions were authorised under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter. Classical peace operations are often referred to as Chapter VI missions. This refers to the fact that these missions are only authorised to use minimum force, in other words, to only use force in self-defence.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the chapter that provides for enforcement powers. It is entitled 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression'. Article 39 empowers the UN Security Council to 'determine' threats to the peace, make 'recommendations', or 'decide' what measures need to be taken to restore international peace and

ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement actions occur when the UN Security Council authorises the use of force to restore a breach in the international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to restore peace in cases where one party has been identified as the aggressor, and/or to undertake punitive measures against a country that in some other way is in contravention of international norms. 'Enforcement' is different from 'peace enforcement' in that impartiality is not a factor in 'enforcement', as the aim is not to make peace between conflicting parties, but to act against a party that has been identified as the aggressor.

CIMIC IN SOMALIA

Coordination activities have taken place in many UN peace operations missions through the years, particularly since 1989. In fact, one can argue that the experiences of the UN in its peace operations missions in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, and especially in Somalia and during UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, laid the groundwork for the development of the modern CIMIC concept.

What we now call CIMIC was more or less the same kind of practices that UN commanders developed over the years to coordinate their activities with the other UN, international and local actors in their environment. For instance, in Somalia the various contingents were inundated with requests for security escorts for food convoys. As the demand grew the contingents requested the humanitarian agencies and NGOs to convey their requests at formal coordination meetings, and then arranged such meetings on a regular basis. In some cases these regular meetings were institutionalised into Civil-Military Coordination Centres (CMOCs).

In Somalia these coordination structures, procedures and policies were not uniform among the contingents and the range and limitations of military support to humanitarian operations were unclear and, at times, inconsistent.

security. Article 41 deals with enforcement measures ‘not involving the use of armed force’, such as economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 gives the UN Security Council the power to take any action that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Most UN Security Council resolutions don’t refer to a specific chapter in the UN Charter when authorising an operation, but most analysts agree that any mandate beyond self-defence derives its authority from the UN’s powers under Chapter VII. If a peace operations mission is authorised to use ‘all necessary means to defend innocent civilians’ or any wording to that effect, it would generally be regarded as having some Chapter VII powers. Many peace operations have been given Chapter VII mandates, especially since the end

MULTINATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

Multinational Force (MNF) is a reference to any grouping of countries or a coalition of the willing that come together to undertake a joint operation. A MNF is normally associated with peace enforcement operations authorised by the UN Security Council (see ‘Enforcement’).

PEACEBUILDING

Action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The UN also distinguishes between preventive peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding.

of the Cold War, and this has, to a large degree, added to the confusion in terminology between what constitutes ‘peace operations’, as opposed to ‘peace enforcement’.

The UN Charter remains relevant to any discussion and analysis of peace operations, because no matter how peace operations adapt to their environment, they have to remain true to the spirit, principles and provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The first UN observer mission was deployed in Palestine under the name the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) after the first Arab/Israeli war from June 1948 until the end of the 1950s. The early missions were intended to be nothing more than a symbolic presence, consisting of lightly-armed or unarmed military personnel from around the world, deployed to ‘internationalise’ an inter-state conflict, and raise the political costs of a resumption of war, once a ceasefire has been reached.

In 1960, the UN was asked to establish a massive operation in the Republic of the Congo. Its scope and mission was unprecedented in an era otherwise known for its small-scale and limited peace operations. At its peak, the UN Operation in the Congo had more than 20,000 troops and 2,000 civilian technical experts (the same size as the largest contemporary UN peace operation in Africa). The conflict in the Congo resulted in the death of

DDR: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION

DDR is the process during which combatants are disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into the community. In the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) the DDR process is referred to as Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) to accommodate the fact some of the combatants had to be repatriated to their country of origin while others wished to be resettled rather than to be reintegrated into their original communities. In Liberia, this process is known as DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration). Each country may thus use a slightly different version to address its specific needs.

250 UN peacekeepers, including the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a plane crash. After this disastrous experience, the conventional wisdom in 1964 in international circles was that the UN would never again deploy a peace operations mission in a civil war situation.

Indeed, during the Cold War period that followed, all peace operations missions undertaken were of the classical inter-state ceasefire monitoring type – for example, the missions in Kashmir, Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the Sinai desert.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a new period of hope in the United Nations and new types of expanded peace operations were undertaken in the early 1990s in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. These missions went much further than the classical observer-type missions in that they assisted parties to implement comprehensive ceasefire and peace agreements. In the case of Namibia and Cambodia, they temporarily oversaw the transitional arrangements.

The experiences of the UN in the mid-1990s, however, especially the failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 and the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, resulted in many doubting the future role of UN peace operations. Some European countries opted rather for sub-regional peace operations through NATO. In 1993, the UN had over 70,000 peace operations personnel deployed around the world, with total expenditures ranging from US\$3–4 billion per annum. In 1998, however, this figure hovered around 10,000 personnel, with expenditure barely exceeding US\$800 million.

This trend was suddenly reversed in 1999, when new missions were deployed in Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Democratic Republic of the

PEACE OPERATIONS

In the UN context, 'peace operations' is used as a broad term for any UN (blue-hat) operational deployment that is aimed at supporting a peace process. For instance, the name of the department responsible for such operations is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

UN peace operations typically include civilian, police and military components and are headed by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Depending on the type of mission, the civilian component typically includes units that specialise in political affairs, legal affairs, civil affairs and human rights and, in recent operations, often separate gender and child protection units, and units that specialise in electoral affairs, DDR, public information, and mission support (finance, personnel, administration and logistics). Police officers, together with prison experts and legal advisers, deal with the rule of law aspects of the peace process, including justice sector reform.

Congo (MONUC), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE). It would appear that the international community, when confronted by multiple conflicts outside of Europe, realised once again that the UN is the only appropriate global body to deal with international peace and security.

By 2004, the UN peace operations budget had reached almost US\$3 billion, for 11 peace operations. By early 2007 the number of missions had increased to 18, with approximately 100,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers deployed, and an unprecedented UN peacekeeping budget of approximately US\$5.2 billion¹. In comparison with the small and weak UN missions of the mid- to late-1990s, the contemporary UN complex peace operations represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in Africa, and to use the United Nations as the vehicle of choice for these types of operations.

CONTEMPORARY UNITED NATIONS COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS

Contemporary UN complex peace operations are in effect peacebuilding operations, in that they have mandates that combine political, security, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict².

The UN's capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The European Union (EU) is the only other multilateral body that currently has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term, but it has not yet demonstrated its capacity to deploy such operations. The EU is also the only multilateral body that has the potential to integrate a sixth dimension, namely trade.

INTEGRATED MISSIONS

Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN³. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the 'integrated missions' model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team, that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peace operation, that is peace and security focused.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a 'Note on Integrated Missions' that describes the concept as follows:

An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN System seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.⁴

MISSION CIVILIAN COMPONENTS

- Political affairs
- Public information
- Human rights
- Electoral
- Civil affairs
- Gender
- Child protection
- Legal affairs (RoL)
- DDR
- Humanitarian affairs
- Mission support
 - Administration
 - Personnel
 - Finance
 - Logistics
 - JLC
 - MOVCON
 - IT
 - Communications

The current UN missions in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Sudan, all have integrated mission management structures.

As with any innovation, this model has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organisational and budgetary challenges, that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented⁵. A comprehensive study⁶ was commissioned and completed in May 2005 and, as of December 2005, Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted as the mission structure of choice⁷. It will be the dominant management structure for UN complex peace operations in the near- to mid-term, and it is likely that the EU, AU and others will try to apply some of its core features to their own future missions.

The AU in particular has started to adopt some of the integrated missions terminology into its evolving African Stand-by Force concepts⁸. However, it is important to distinguish between the scope for integration that exists within the UN System and that of the African Union. While it is possible, under certain circumstances, to integrate the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) function with UN peace operations to establish an UN integrated mission in the system-wide coherence context, it is inconceivable that the UN RC/HC function can be integrated with the AU, EU, NATO, or any other non-UN peace operation. This is because the humanitarian and development coordination mandate has been entrusted to the UN System because of its unique position in the international body politic⁹. This does not imply that the UN development and humanitarian community, and others such as the AU, EU and NATO, cannot coordinate closely or even, under certain circumstances, cooperate, but it is unlikely that they can be ‘integrated’ in the same technical system-wide meaning that this concept implies in the UN System context.

Instead, integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multidimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AU's 'Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)' refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process¹⁰, as opposed to the UN's 'Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)' that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and planners from the UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies, i.e. a system-wide initiative. Integration in the AU and other non-UN contexts should thus be understood as combining certain functions, typically the military, police and civilian (which includes substantive and mission support functions) in multidimensional or complex operations.

USE OF FORCE

Another trend is the new more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary UN complex peace operations in Africa¹¹ are still grounded in, and characterised by, the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice, have undergone significant development.

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must invite the UN presence and agree on its role, but it is now recognised that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent on all levels in the field.

Impartiality still implies that UN peace operations will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but does not imply that the UN will stand-by when civilians are in imminent threat of danger (if the mission has a civilian protection mandate), nor that it will not record and report (for instance, to the International Criminal Court) human rights abuses that may have or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict.

Minimum use of force still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including to those it has been mandated to protect.

It is unlikely, for the foreseeable future, that the UN Security Council will deploy new complex peace operations in Africa, or elsewhere, without mandates that reflect this new interpretation and contain elements of Chapter VII's enforcement authority.

COLLABORATIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

One of the innovations that emerged from the nexus between peacebuilding and robust peace operations in the context of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), is collaborative offensive operations. MONUC is operating alongside, and in support of, the integrated brigades of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the FARDC), in offensive operations aimed at protecting civilians and forcefully disarming armed groups.

Some of the collaborative offensive operations undertaken have had the desired effect in that they have resulted in larger numbers of combatants entering the disarmament process. However, these operations have also raised various technical, budgetary and administrative challenges. The most serious concerns relate to the unintended consequences¹² generated by these UN-directed and supported actions, including the impact of the predatory behaviour of some of the FARDC troops on the populations where they have been deployed, and the human rights abuses and internal displacements that have come about as a result.

CIVIL PROTECTION

Another interesting example of the trend towards greater synergy and cohesion across the traditional security and development divide is the way in which civil protection is emerging as a common theme for both the humanitarian and peace operations community. Since 1999, seven UN peace operations – Burundi, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan – have been mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.¹³ In 2005, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination (RC/HC) of the UN Observation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ross Mountain, took the initiative to establish a protection working group that explored the potential of using protection as a common theme among the military, police and civilian peacekeepers and the humanitarian community¹⁴. After a successful pilot period in North Kivu the concept was broadened to the rest of the country. Similar initiatives are underway in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Civil protection is set to become one of the dominant themes of UN peace operations in the short- to medium-term.

SNAPSHOT OF A COMPLEX PEACE OPERATION: UNMIL

A snapshot of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in August 2004 provides an opportunity to see a complex peace operation in action. This was a context where the peace process was very fragile, and where humanitarian relief and security issues were high on the agenda, while many post-conflict reconstruction processes were already underway. UNMIL was also, in a sense, a laboratory, in that the UN peace operations mission’s mandate and structure clearly reflected a post-conflict reconstruction posture. Many of the mission’s offices, units

and programmes were new to UN peace operations, or reflected a new expanded vision that had not yet been applied elsewhere. For instance, the humanitarian coordination function was fully integrated with the peace operations mission, and this approach set the tone for improved coordination over the full spectrum of post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

The United Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had a senior management structure consisting of:

- ✿ SRSB;
- ✿ Deputy SRSB for Operations and Rule of Law;
- ✿ Deputy SRSB for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction;
- ✿ Force Commander;
- ✿ UN Police Commissioner;
- ✿ Director of Administration; and
- ✿ a number of civilian sections.

Reporting directly to the SRSB were the:

- ✿ Gender Adviser Unit;
- ✿ Legal Affairs Section;
- ✿ Communications and Public Information Office;
- ✿ Resident Auditor;
- ✿ HIV/AIDS Unit; and
- ✿ Political Planning and Policy unit.

Reporting to the DSRSB for Operations and Rule of Law were the:

- ✿ Civil Affairs Section;
- ✿ Corrections and Prison Advisory Service;
- ✿ Human Rights and Protection Section;
- ✿ Legal and Judicial System Support Division;
- ✿ Disarmament, Demobilisation (DD) Section;

- ✿ UN Police Commissioner; and
- ✿ Electoral Advisory Unit.

The Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction has a Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation Section that is sub-divided into two units and four sector offices, namely a Resource Mobilisation and Trust Fund Programme and Quick Impact Projects Unit and an Integrated Humanitarian Coordination and NGO Liaison Unit.

The Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction is also the RC/HC. The UNCT is made up by the:

- ✿ UNDP;
- ✿ UNICEF;
- ✿ UNFPA;
- ✿ UNHCR;
- ✿ WHO;
- ✿ WFP;
- ✿ FAO;
- ✿ OCHA;
- ✿ IOM;
- ✿ World Bank; and
- ✿ the UN Field Security Coordinator (UNFSCO).

Following an agreement to pursue an integration strategy, OCHA formally merged with UNMIL's Humanitarian Coordination and NGO liaison Unit on 1 July 2004.

UNMIL follows an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP). The IMIP is a consolidated mission-wide strategic and operational framework for the implementation of UNMIL's mandate. On the basis of UNSC Resolution 1509 the IMIP identifies eight core goals and breaks these down into 86 projects. The core goals are:

1. consolidation and strengthening of peace and security;
2. establishment of mechanisms and programmes for disarmament and demobilisation;
3. rehabilitation and reintegration of all ex-combatants into civil-society;

4. establishment of the rule of law;
5. establishment of safeguards for human rights;
6. facilitation of, and the functioning and restoration of, state authority;
7. provision of factual information to the public through public media campaigns; and
8. coordination of UN agencies.

NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY

There is a difference between the way the terms 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' are used and understood in the peacekeeping and humanitarian communities.

In the peacekeeping context you may often hear people say we are 'impartial' but not 'neutral'. By this they mean that while the peacekeeping mission will not take sides in a conflict, it is not indifferent to the actions of the belligerent parties. Should one of the parties be in contravention of the spirit or the letter of a peace agreement or ceasefire, the mission will take action, according to the powers they have in their mandate, to try to rectify the situation. Impartiality also means that the peacekeepers will not stand idly by when they witness, or become aware of, atrocities or human rights abuses. The type of action they can take will be determined by their mandate. In other words, in the peacekeeping context 'neutrality' is seen as non-intervention, or not taking action, while 'impartially' means non-allegiance.

This can be confusing because, in the humanitarian community, 'neutrality' and 'impartiality' have different meanings altogether. Neutrality and impartiality are fundamental humanitarian principles, together with humanity and independence. In the context of these humanitarian principles 'impartiality' means non-discrimination, i.e. non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, creed, religion, etc. while 'neutrality' means non-allegiance, i.e. not taking sides in the conflict.

It is important for CIMIC Officers, and other stakeholders, to be aware of the differences in the way these concepts are being used, so that they can guard against any misunderstandings that may arise as a result.

	Neutrality	Impartiality
Peacekeeping Operations	Non-intervention	Non-allegiance
Humanitarian Action	Non-allegiance	Non-discrimination

The UNCT in Liberia works on the basis of three key strategy and planning documents: the 2003–2005 UNDAF; the 2004 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) and the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGOL), UN and WB Joint Needs Assessment (this document formed the basis for the Liberia Reconstruction Conference that took place in February 2004). The Joint Needs Assessment was systematically constructed as a Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), and an Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) was established. RIMCO is headed by the Chairman of the NTGOL, with the United Nations and the World Bank as vice-chairs.

The RFTF framework identifies results expected in nine priority areas: security, restructuring and retraining of the Armed Forces of Liberia; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; assistance to refugees; strengthening governance, democratic development and the rule of law; preparations for elections; provision of basic social services; restoration of key public infrastructure; and, strengthening economic management capacity. The RIMCO structure provides for nine RFTF Technical Working Committees (RWC), one for each of the sectors identified above. Each RWC is chaired by a government representative, typically the relevant minister, and co-chaired by the appropriate UN agency.

As the post-conflict reconstruction process is still in the early stages it is crucial to establish coordination mechanisms that will result in the exchange of information across dimensions, so that those working in, for instance, refugee repatriation and elections, can adjust their planning based on the feedback received from those working with the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants. Meaningful and effective coordination is thus a key contributing factor to ensuring that the international community's investment in post-conflict reconstruction programmes in a given situation results in sustainable peace.

ENDNOTES

1. All the United Nations peacekeeping operations statistics in this paper were calculated from the DPKO Background Note of 31 March 2007, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>, accessed on 7 May 2007.
2. This description of peacebuilding was first formulated by the author and Senzo Ngubane for an ACCORD study on Peacebuilding in southern Africa commissioned by JICA in 2004. It was subsequently further refined by the author for the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework developed by ACCORD for the Peace and Security Programme of the NEPAD Secretariat (NEPAD, 2005).
3. Uvin, P. 2002, 'The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.5.
4. United Nations, Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Issued by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2005, paragraph 4. See also the Revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, dated 17 January 2006, and released under a Note from the Secretary-General on 9 February 2006, paragraph 4.

5. Amongst others: Dahrendorf, N. 2003, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, King's College, London; Porter, T. 2002, *An External Review of the CAP*, OCHA, New York; Sommers, Marc. 2000, *The Dynamics of Coordination*, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40, Providence; Stockton, N. 2002, *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan*, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Kabul; Donini, A. 2002, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Occasional Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence; Reindorp, N. and Wiles, P. 2001, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*, A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, and Duffield, M., Lautze S. and Jones, B. 1998, *Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York.
6. Smith, D. 2003, 'Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding', PRIO, Oslo, p.16.
7. Barth Eide, E, Kaspersen, A.T, Kent, R. and von Hippel, K. 2005, 'Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations', Independent Study of the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, NUPI, Oslo. 'Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions', Secretary-General of the United Nations, 9 December 2005.
8. In May 2003 the African Union embarked on an initiative to develop an African Stand-by Force. The first ASF Policy Framework was adopted by the third meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, and endorsed by the Maputo Summit in July 2003. The concept was subsequently further developed through a series of workshops in 2005 and 2006 that looked at doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, standing operating procedures, and command, control and communications.
9. General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 14 April 1992.
10. 'Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Stand-by Force', African Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), 1 September 2006.
11. MONUC (DRC) since December 1999 with currently 20,812 personnel and a budget of US\$1.2 billion; ONUB (Burundi) since June 2004 with currently 4,384 personnel and a budget of US\$308 million; UNMIL (Liberia) since September 2003 with currently 17,406 personnel and a budget of US\$760 million; UNMIS (Sudan) since March 2005 with currently 11,277 personnel and a budget of US\$969 million; UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire) since April 2004 with currently 8,528 personnel and a budget of US\$438 million and UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) that was established in October 1999 and used to be the largest UN peacekeeping operation with almost 18,000 personnel and an annual budget of approximately US\$720 million, but has now been downsized and transformed into a peacebuilding office UNIOSIL with 188 personnel as of 1 January 2006.
12. Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), 'The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations', United Nations University Press, 2007, Tokyo.
13. See Victoria K. Holt, 'The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities' in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmar, 'Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations', HPG Report 21, March 2006 (www.odihpn.org).
14. Author interviews and correspondence with Paul Bonard, Senior Protection Adviser to DSRSG RC/HC, MONUC, 2005 and 2006.