The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 50 years after its establishment and its early prominence as a norm entrepreneur, is now facing a crisis. Its frameworks, which once to sought to deepen integration and influence state behaviour are now in tatters, unable to elicit member states’ compliance and resulting in significant security challenges since 2020. Its inability to provide effective leadership in addressing violent extremism in the Sahel has directly contributed to the coups d’etat in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger—events which have, in turn, been used to justify unconstitutional changes of government.
True to form, ECOWAS, responded to these unconstitutional changes without first undertaking a careful analysis of their underlying causes. Instead it sought to enforce compliance with its norms through sanctions and pressure on the recalcitrant member states. Paradoxically, while criticising these states and threatening them with expulsion, ECOWAS overlooked the potential of ad hoc cooperative security initiatives involving these same states to address extremist threats in the Sahel and the coastal regions. Fifty years after ECOWAS’s establishment in 1975, its integration processes are at risk of unravelling. This blog explores how ECOWAS’s failure to provide credible security guarantees and uphold institutional integrity has, in fact, contributed to increasing insecurity across the region.
The Challenge of Insecurity
Insecurity, exclusionary politics and corruption have been used as justificatory arguments, especially in the Sahel, as justifications for regime change. This region of strategic economic, political and security importance, provides several insights into the challenges faced by ECOWAS.
First, extremist jihadist actors in the region have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to withstand bilateral and multilateral interventions. Second, the discovery of oil and gas reserves, gold, uranium and deep aquifers in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, have turned the region into a hotbed of geostrategic and political competition.
ECOWAS’s failure to respond to different forms of unconstitutional changes of government in the subregion and its subsequent attempts to act differently in Niger are both instructive and symptomatic of the institutional inertia and bureaucratic-technical missteps that undermine the organisation’s credibility. This decision, however, was overtaken by events in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. In late 2023, these states formed an Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) and in January 2024 served notice to ECOWAS of their intention to exit from ECOWAS in what has become an ECOWEXIT.
ECOWAS’s failure to respond to different forms of unconstitutional changes of government in the subregion and its subsequent attempts to act differently in Niger are both instructive and symptomatic of the institutional inertia and bureaucratic-technical missteps that undermine the organisation’s credibility
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ECOWAS at a Crossroads.
With the suspension of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS and the establishment of the AES, the original ECOWAS cooperative security framework has ended, and as a result, the Accra Initiative (AI) has also been undermined by mistrust, misunderstanding and suspicion resulting in the formal withdrawal of the AES states. ECOWAS’s misreading of the developments in the Sahel led the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Heads of States Summit, Bola Tinubu of Nigeria, to describe this alliance as a ‘phantom attempt.’
An Emerging Eecurity Reconfiguration? Togo, AES and ‘new’ Security Arrangements?
However, with the formal withdrawal of the AES states, ECOWAS has ceased to exist. It has failed as a norm entrepreneur. Uncertainty about the future of the AI is underpinned by mistrust and what seems to be the emergence of even more security reconfigurations with AES states, Chad and Togo. This has resulted in other states joining the AES in conducting joint military exercises known as ‘Tarhanakale’ (which means the ‘love of the fatherland’ in the local Nigerien language Tamajek). In May 2024, the AES states, together with Chad and Togo undertook joint military exercises. Commencing on May 20, these joint forces have been training and undertaking joint operations at the Tillia training centre in western Niger near Mali. The official explanation was to make the AES armed forces: (a) more resilient; (b) operationally strong against all conceivable threats; (c) strengthen ties with local populations; (d) enhance the interoperability and collaboration among the military forces of the nations involved; (e) conduct tactical exercises to reinforce operational capabilities and resilience in response to the varying degrees of jihadist threats and to address broader regional security challenges. Finally, from the perspective of building and strengthening community resilience, Operation Tarhanakale sought to enhance interoperability, tactical manoeuvres, and offer health care to citizens.
However, the role of Togo raises concerns about the efficacy, trust and operational bonds with the AI. A possible explanatory lens is provided by the Togolese President, who has in recent times stated clearly the need “… for a rethink of international and regional collaboration to better fight the terrorist challenge, particularly through a ‘new military cooperation organisation’ in West Africa.”
Togo’s position with respect to ECOWAS, AI and the AES deserves some analysis and interpretation. First, Togo’s implicit stance is that ECOWAS has shifted significantly from its original mission and mandate, which was to promote regional economic integration and not to meddle in the domestic political affairs of its member states. According to one official, Togo is always ‘watching ECOWAS closely with one eye closed.’ Second, the sequence of utterances and statements prior to Togo’s participation in joint military exercises with the AES states and Chad is significant. Togo had already communicated its desire for a new security framework at the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. Third, Togo’s close engagement with the AES states will strengthen and undermine the AI, making it even more difficult for ECOWAS to entice them to return to the fold. Fourth, Togo’s relationship with the AES is no longer driven solely by security concerns, but also by economic imperatives–particularly the strategic interest in increasing the transportation of transit goods through the Port Autonome de Lomé. Fifth, through its actions, Togo has become an ‘ex officio member of the AES.’
Togo’s implicit stance is that ECOWAS has shifted significantly from its original mission and mandate, which was to promote regional economic integration and not to meddle in the domestic political affairs of its member states
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Conclusion
West Africa’s current difficulties require creative ideas and leadership from ECOWAS and its proponents. So far, its responses to democratic reversals have been variously characterised as a ‘mistake’ and ‘…killing itself softly.’ The net effect of ECOWAS’s inactions have ‘…[brought] shame to an already divided [organisation].’ Whether or not ECOWAS has been permanently reduced to an ECO-WAS, the future of regional collaboration in West Africa still has the potential to become an important force for democracy and stability in the region simply by enforcing its own rules and values consistently.
Prof Kwesi Aning is the Head of the Office for International Cooperation in the Office of the Commandant of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana.
