COVID-19 has undoubtedly presented the biggest test of the resilience and relevance of Higher Education institutions in recent times. With the necessity for behavioural change to halt the spread of the virus, Higher Education institutions have been forced to think differently and contribute innovative responses to the pandemic.
Like all other parts of the world, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic since 6 March 2020 and all eleven member countries had registered their first cases by 6 April 2020. In addition to a number of steps taken by ECCAS, plans are also moving forward to establish a sub-regional body for the coordination of health issues in ECCAS.
Among other things, Cameroon has responded to the pandemic by relying on local political practices as well as diplomatic experiences with neighbouring countries in order to maintain its sub-regional leadership. By analysing how COVID-19 shapes local governance, this piece looks on the one hand at the entanglement between conflicts and the pandemic and on the other hand, it shows how the ‘sedimentation’ of the new pandemic unveils local political practices which affect Cameroon’s relationships with neighbouring countries.
The two rounds of presidential elections in December 2020 and March 2021 resulted in the re-election of Faustin Archange Touadéra as President of the Central African Republic. Armed groups disrupted the electoral process in several areas, but the armed forces of CAR with support from the UN mission, Russia and Rwanda were able to sufficiently stabilise the situation for the elections to be successfully concluded.
It is now more than a year since the first COVID-19 case in the Central African Republic (CAR). Although the pandemic has spread at a slower rate and with less intensity than in many other countries, it has still had a significant impact on the country and its people. The December 2020 elections are one example of how COVID-19 is impacting every aspect of our lives, including our politics.
The first COVID-19 case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was diagnosed on 10 March 2020. As of 11 April 2021, more than twenty-eight thousand cases have been recorded, but fortunately only 745 persons have succumbed to the pandemic. Beyond the impact on the health system, it is worth noting that the pandemic has generated several other challenges, including constitutional, human rights and security issues.
Mediation in situations of civil conflict are never easy. It requires travel, both air and on the ground, sometimes to far off areas where the terrain may not be easy to traverse. It also requires confidential face-to-face discussions and, when momentum towards an agreement is detected, then time becomes a valuable commodity, and shuttling between parties to narrow differences, and edge towards a compromise, becomes vital.
It will take more than just the political will of international and national actors to pave a smooth path for long-term stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Based on its security, social, and political dynamics, the DRC needs a total rebuilding of its institutions.
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic one year ago, the Horn of Africa region has experienced a proliferation of conflict and inter-state tensions. This has served to exacerbate the already dire displacement and refugee situation in the region, with thousands fleeing their homes in search of security, which is not often easily found. These difficulties are being aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated challenges.
South Sudan’s peace process is still largely up for negotiation. A new South Sudan must emerge through a civilian technocratic government. This will require transforming the way security forces control the state. It also means being serious about addressing the root causes of conflict, implementing a transitional parliament, drafting a new constitution, deciding what type of federalism best suits the country and strengthening the electoral commission.
The peace process in South Sudan is still highly vulnerable to relapse. Although the Revitalized Peace Agreement has brought large-scale fighting to an end, inter-communal conflict has flared up and will most likely be a major cause of instability and displacement in the year ahead. The implementation of the peace agreement has been slow and uneven with the parties mainly focused on elite power-sharing arrangements. In the meantime, the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has contributed to delaying the full implementation of the peace agreement and it has also disrupted the work of the United Nations. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has implemented enhanced mitigation and prevention measures after a recent significant increase in COVID-19 cases in South Sudan, which has been mirrored by an increase in cases among UN personnel.
South Sudan is the world’s youngest nation and one of the least populated countries in Africa, but also one of the most vulnerable to climate change. The consequences of climate change can worsen South Sudan’s humanitarian crises and fragile security environment, marked by widespread communal conflict and a civil war since 2013. With a population estimated at 11 million, more than 1.6 million people have been internally displaced due to prolonged conflict.
When it comes to climate change, Africa and Europe have one thing in common: countries in both regions are either signatories or parties to the Paris Agreement, which entered into force in 2016. This is not a trivial matter. It means that the 2017 Abidjan AU-EU Summit climate ambitions were based on a firm and approved framework. The EU, Africa’s main trading partner, has demonstrated its ambition to lead the climate transition with its European Green Deal. Africans should commend these policy goals and emulate them as much as possible, while at the same time warning their Northern partners about the possible negative impact of several Green Deal related EU legislations on the continent.
The European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) maintain a long-standing partnership on peace and security which can be qualified as constructive. It is largely based on joint interests and objectives and is less contentious compared to other more challenging topics, such as migration and trade. The EU’s new seven-year budget for 2021 – 2027 introduces new ways of working which impact on how the EU will engage on peace and security in Africa. Most notable in this regard is the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) which can potentially undermine the AU’s role in leading and coordinating peace and security measures on the continent. Moreover, these new developments take place against the backdrop of an overall troubled EU-AU relationship which suffers not only from the divergences in interests in key areas such as migration, trade and climate but also from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, and global geopolitics.
Just a few months ago, many South Sudanese were breathing a sigh of relief, believing that the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic had largely passed them by. Today, a virulent second wave is sweeping through the country causing huge harm to people’s health and wellbeing, damaging the already dire economy, and further interrupting the stagnating peace process. The number of cases is headed towards the 10,000 mark and there have been more than 100 deaths, although the true number of people affected by the virus is likely to be much higher given testing is largely limited to travellers and those with symptoms.
After seven years of deadly conflict and repeated attempts to reach peace deals in South Sudan, former rebel leader Dr. Riek Machar returned to Juba in February 2020 to be sworn in as Vice President as a part of the implementation of the September 2018 agreement. A combination of factors, including a lack of political will from the top leadership, the COVID-19 pandemic, flooding, and economic crises, has ensured very little progress during the implementation period from 22 February 2020, to 22 February 2021. During this time, the parties hesitatingly managed to form a government, but the parliament and national commissions are yet to be created.
March 2021 marks a year after the executive branch of the Revitalized Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was established partially in South Sudan at the national level. Since then the reconstituted Council of Ministers has been operationalized under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, assisted by five Vice Presidents who represent the principal parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). These top political leaders were entrusted with running the machinery of the government through clusters of ministries, commissions, authorities, and independent specialized mechanisms. However, the peace process has been moving at a slow pace as key provisions of the R-ARCSS could not be implemented in time. The presence of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has become questionable too for pushing the parties into creating a conducive environment for the unification of forces, institutional reforms, humanitarian responses, return of displaced citizens, economic reforms, constitutional making, conducting population census and holding general elections towards the end of 36-month transitional period. The scourge of COVID-19 and associated restrictions have further complicated the peace process since 2020.
Since the start of 2021 South Sudan has seen a large increase in COVID-19 cases in the country. Over the course of 2020 and into January 2021 South Sudan recorded 4,000 cases of COVID-19. However, over the next month and a half, from the beginning of February through to March, this number has more than doubled to 8,870 confirmed cases. This rise in cases has unfortunately been accompanied by an increase in the number of COVID-19 related deaths bringing the total number to 102. While the number of tests carried out in South Sudan has risen, it cannot on its own account for the surge in cases. These facts indicate that a second wave, much worse than the first, is currently underway in South Sudan.