One cannot stabilize the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) without building a trustworthy and effective local and national political leadership, desecuritizing the national political narrative, and depoliticizing national security operations.
IGAD upgraded its presence in various IGAD Member States namely; Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda to full time presence instead of ad hoc engagements or small liaison offices, while Djibouti remains the seat of the Secretariat and the Executive Secretary. The IGAD presence in the Republic of South Sudan started with a liaison office at the sub-national regional government of southern Sudan in 2005 to follow up on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and upgraded to a small Juba Liaison Office after South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2011.
The 9th of July 2021 marks the first decade of independence of the Republic of South Sudan and the challenges of nation-state building. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) paved the way for separation of Southern Sudan from the Sudan in 2011 through a referendum for self-determination. Though the parties pledged to make unity of the Sudan attractive, the people did not believe.
Though it is shared by 11 riparian countries, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia dominate the contesting debate over the Nile water resource. Historically, the Nile basin has been dominated by unilateralism, exclusion, colonial and neo-colonial drives to justify Egypt’s and Sudan’s monopoly over the utilization of the shared water resource.
Africa had time to prepare for the pandemic outbreak after the first wave of COVID-19 in China and Europe. However, Africa is one of the continents most affected by the third wave, with South Africa being particularly affected. Africa is faced with over 5.6 million COVID-19 cases and 146 497 deaths (06 July 2021). South Africa is leading with over 2 million coronavirus cases (06 July 2021)
The spread of COVID-19 throughout Africa has not only generated health emergencies across the continent but has also had devastating impacts on local and national economies, lives and livelihoods. Inevitably, marginalised populations such as migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people (IDPs) have been some of the worst affected, including increased risk for their health, wellbeing and protection.
Almost a year and a half later, the coronavirus pandemic continues to exacerbate pre-existing socio-economic and political challenges in Africa. At the onset of the third wave in June, and where most developed countries responded with vigorous vaccination drives, the fate of African populations and their livelihoods remain uncertain and under severe pressure. This article reflects on the way in which countries are responding to the third wave amidst the rollout of vaccines.
The President of the Republic of Mozambique, Filipe Nyusi, addressed the nation last Thursday, 24 June, announcing the introduction of tighter measures as part of efforts to contain the rapid spread of COVID-19.
At the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Mozambique on June 23, 2021, the regional body endorsed a decision to deploy a SADC Standby Force mission to the Republic of Mozambique, by October this year.
Speaking at the G7 Summit held on 13 June 2021, South Africa has commended the G7 and other countries for the collective action taken to overcome the current global health crisis and the commitment to create a better, greener and more prosperous world. Ending the pandemic must be our most immediate priority. COVID-19 is not over.
The COVID-19 pandemic has turned out to be a major crucible for globalization and the interconnected world order, and its multi-faceted impact has dwarfed World War II and the Global Financial Crisis in terms of both compound effects and shocks on a global scale.
As Zambians head to the polls in August 2021, learning from past electoral experiences will be valuable. Bearing in mind that the country is still battling with many challenges associated with the outbreak of the pandemic, this piece argues that avoiding a twin struggle of COVID-19 impacts and electoral violence, by conducting free, fair, credible and peaceful August elections would be the best option to enhance democratic principles and maintain the international standard of holding peaceful elections that Zambia has set for many years.
On 25 May 2021 Mali saw its second coup within less than a year. The developments in May presented an interruption in Mali’s transitional process that makes a successful transition less likely than ever. Mali is again at a crossroads.
Somali leaders signed a landmark election agreement on 27 May 2021 in Mogadishu. Almost immediately afterwards a number of friends and constituents called me to ask why it had taken this long; why we had to go to the brink of armed conflict for them to sign, what, essentially, is a recycled version of the 17 September 2020 Agreement and the Baidoa Technical Team recommendations. How, they asked, could we be sure this agreement would not unravel, like so many agreements before it.
On the afternoon of 24 May 2021, the Malian Transitional President, Bah N’Daw, and his Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested by elements of the Malian Armed Forces and taken to the Soundiata Keïta military camp in Kati. Wild rumours circulated in Bamako. Finally, the Malians were informed of the events that they have become used to for some time. They were wondering about this umpteenth coup d’état.
The coup d’état in Mali which occurred on 24 May 2021, the second in nine months, marks another critical juncture for the country. Mali continues to face a multi-faceted crisis: a resilient jihadist insurgency which is highly active in northern, central and increasingly southern parts of the country, communal violence and the rising prominence of self-defence militias.
This month, the United Nations Security Council will renew the mandate of the 8-year-old United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at a time of multiple transitions and great uncertainties, which we have analysed in this recent EPON report.
Since May 2020, violent conflict has killed 2,070 people in Mali. Insecurity has forcibly displaced more than 300,000 people, of whom 56 per cent are women. The drivers of Mali’s multiple conflicts are not arcane. Meaningful dialogues around poverty, marginalisation, limited livelihood opportunities, weak governance, political instability and more, can open doors to engaging with the community militias and armed groups that operate in the country. More reason, then, to ensure that the turbulent winds of climate change do not blow those doors shut.