On 5 October 2017, unknown armed men attacked the town of Mocimboa da Praia, in the far North of the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. The attack primarily targeted government institutions, with a focus on police stations. The attack was later determined to have been carried out by members of the local communities, primarily young Muslim men. The government’s security forces acted quickly to stop the attacks and keep the situation under control. As a result, some of the attackers were either killed or arrested. This appears to have infuriated them, as they simply went underground and metamorphosed into guerrilla units capable of confronting government security forces after three years.
On 22 March 2020, the first case of COVID-19 was announced in Mozambique, followed by the government’s declaration of its first state of emergency on 1 April 2020. In the northern region of Cabo Delgado and neighbouring provinces, the spread of the virus is of additional relevance as, at the time of writing, more than 670,000 people have been displaced due to violent extremist attacks.
The Group of Five for the Sahel, commonly known as the G5 SAHEL was created in 2014 by the governments of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger as a platform to collectively address the development and security challenges confronting them. When carefully analysed, one can see some similarities between Cabo Delgado’s growing challenges with violent extremism and the case of the Sahel.
The unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 pandemic took us all by surprise and it interrupted the ‘normal’, rigidly structured operations of many institutions. The world as we knew it became a distant memory as we all scrambled to modify our systems of operation and adapt them to the new normal.
Pre-pandemic, much focus – rightly so – was given to education as a key tool for delivering Africa’s demographic dividend. Essentially, that if continental nations invested in their growing population of children and young people – particularly in their schooling and skills development – and adopted economic policies to create new jobs, Africa as a whole would see significant increases in per capita incomes. Fast-forward to April 2021 – one year into the COVID-19 crisis – and millions of children are not learning and are forgetting what they learned.
In recent years, there has been a new awareness of the need to hold states to account on their international law obligations to provide quality education for all children, and their duty to regulate private education. It is important not to let COVID-19 set us back on the momentum that was gathering around this issue. What makes it more difficult is that while COVID-19 scythed through government education budgets, and also led to the closure of many low fee private schools, it also created new opportunities for the private sector, particularly in the edu-tech sector.
COVID-19 has undoubtedly presented the biggest test of the resilience and relevance of Higher Education institutions in recent times. With the necessity for behavioural change to halt the spread of the virus, Higher Education institutions have been forced to think differently and contribute innovative responses to the pandemic.
The first COVID-19 case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was diagnosed on 10 March 2020. As of 11 April 2021, more than twenty-eight thousand cases have been recorded, but fortunately only 745 persons have succumbed to the pandemic. Beyond the impact on the health system, it is worth noting that the pandemic has generated several other challenges, including constitutional, human rights and security issues.
It is now more than a year since the first COVID-19 case in the Central African Republic (CAR). Although the pandemic has spread at a slower rate and with less intensity than in many other countries, it has still had a significant impact on the country and its people. The December 2020 elections are one example of how COVID-19 is impacting every aspect of our lives, including our politics.
The two rounds of presidential elections in December 2020 and March 2021 resulted in the re-election of Faustin Archange Touadéra as President of the Central African Republic. Armed groups disrupted the electoral process in several areas, but the armed forces of CAR with support from the UN mission, Russia and Rwanda were able to sufficiently stabilise the situation for the elections to be successfully concluded.
Among other things, Cameroon has responded to the pandemic by relying on local political practices as well as diplomatic experiences with neighbouring countries in order to maintain its sub-regional leadership. By analysing how COVID-19 shapes local governance, this piece looks on the one hand at the entanglement between conflicts and the pandemic and on the other hand, it shows how the ‘sedimentation’ of the new pandemic unveils local political practices which affect Cameroon’s relationships with neighbouring countries.
Like all other parts of the world, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic since 6 March 2020 and all eleven member countries had registered their first cases by 6 April 2020. In addition to a number of steps taken by ECCAS, plans are also moving forward to establish a sub-regional body for the coordination of health issues in ECCAS.