In April 2025, the United Kingdom (UK) held a conference to establish a contact group to help facilitate ceasefire talks in Sudan. The conference brought together foreign ministers from about 20 countries and civic organisations in an attempt to take a step towards peace in Sudan. While the conflict in Sudan does not garner as many headlines as the conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine, it is currently, according to the United Nations, the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. This conference in the UK sought to find solutions to the conflict in Sudan, without the participation of the Sudanese, with neither of the warring sides, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), invited to attend.
The conference in the UK had modest goals, aiming to establish a more coherent approach to mediating the conflict. Its priorities included reaching agreement on lifting humanitarian aid restrictions in Sudan and establishing a contact group that would encourage mediation efforts rather than escalating violence amongst the wider parties to the conflict, in particular the Middle Eastern states. The conference was arguably unsuccessful, as the participants, in particular Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), failed to agree on the wording for the final communique.
While there is general consensus that the SAF and RSF are not yet willing to come to the negotiating table, the logic of excluding the Sudanese from a conference about Sudan, must still be questioned. As foreign diplomats, donors, and regional powers debated the country’s future, Sudanese civilians, civil society leaders, and representatives from both warring parties were notably absent. Thus, what was presented ultimately was a diplomatic engagement devoid of a Sudanese voice.
This exclusion is not novel. Since the revolution in 2019, the warring parties and international actors have repeatedly frustrated the Sudanese transition by seemingly prioritising their strategic interests over the aspirations of the Sudanese people. The military’s dominance following the removal of Abdalla Hamdok, and the international community’s tacit acceptance of it, was a contributing factor to the war that erupted in April 2023. The conflict, between the SAF and RSF, has devastated the country, with equally alarming regional ramifications. In February 2025, the RSF signed a strategic alliance with the SPLM-N faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, with the intention of forming a rival administration in Sudan, comprising the SPLM-N controlled states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The agreement has the effect of further fragmenting the country by creating parallel administrations in Sudan, one led by the SAF and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the other by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and the RSF, all backed by competing foreign powers. Further, this alignment has fuelled fears of cross-border conflict with South Sudan, where ethnic tensions and unresolved militia rivalries remain volatile outside of the capital of Juba. The risk of the Sudanese conflict spilling southward, or of the South Sudanese conflict spilling northward, raises the threat of broader regional destabilisation, particularly in the oil-producing areas on which both countries heavily depend for revenue.
Since the revolution in 2019, the warring parties and international actors have repeatedly frustrated the Sudanese transition by seemingly prioritising their strategic interests over the aspirations of the Sudanese people.
Tweet
Significantly, Sudan is no longer just a civil war, it has now morphed into a proxy battleground for external powers, hence the conference held in the UK. A basic overview shows that Egypt allegedly supports the SAF, viewing Burhan as a more stable and a reliable partner, particularly in safeguarding Nile water interests. The UAE, by contrast, has reportedly long backed Hemedti and the RSF, attracted by his control of gold mines and thus his usefulness in providing Abu Dhabi with strategic access to resources and agricultural land. Moreover, Russia, through Africa Corps-affiliated networks (formerly Wagner), has supplied arms and courted both factions, eyeing access to the Red Sea arena, through the establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, as well as access to resources elsewhere in the country. Meanwhile, Western powers continue to issue statements of concern while failing to build consensus or leverage on how to mediate the issue of competing foreign interests in Sudan. This proxy dynamic was on full display at the London Conference. Disagreements between Arab powers – particularly Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia – prevented a constructive outcome on any coordinated peace initiative. With Sudanese voices, including historically vocal civilian formations like the Taqaddum coalition, absent, the conference revealed a troubling trend: international diplomacy concerning Sudan is increasingly being shaped by external rivalries rather than internal realities. While aid may help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in the short term, without a political roadmap anchored in Sudanese participation, it will do little to halt the war.
There are clear consequences to this exclusion. When diplomacy ignores the people most affected, it loses legitimacy. Sudanese civil society, which played the decisive role in the 2019 revolution, has repeatedly called for an inclusive national dialogue. Women’s groups, resistance committees, and youth leaders have frameworks for peace rooted in justice and reconciliation and yet the grave reality is that these grassroots visions are routinely side-lined in favour of elite-led negotiations. To restore credibility and move toward a peaceful resolution, the international community must correct its course on Sudan. First, future talks must include Sudanese civilian actors, who have made significant sacrifices in their pursuit of post-conflict development, rather than just focussing on warring parties or regional sponsors. Second, the diplomatic process must be de-militarised, the current fixation with “stability” through any means has only yielded further destruction. Third, humanitarian aid distribution should be localised, thus empowering Sudanese-led humanitarian networks to bypass corrupt or abusive intermediaries.
When diplomacy ignores the people most affected, it loses legitimacy. Sudanese civil society, which played the decisive role in the 2019 revolution, has repeatedly called for an inclusive national dialogue.
Tweet
It is undeniable that the Sudanese revolution was never just about removing Bashir and his administration. It was a collective demand for dignity, self-determination, and democratic governance. What has become clear is that these ideals cannot be fulfilled through donor pledges and humanitarian aid alone. They require a shift in how peace is conceived: from the top-down performance we saw in London to also include the grassroots efforts in Sudan. If international actors truly are to support Sudan, they must stop deciding its fate behind closed doors, as the future of Sudan belongs to its people, not to external powers which exert influence for strategic gain.
Keenan Govender is an Independent Researcher focusing on leadership, governance, peace and security, and a former Programme Officer in the Research Unit at ACCORD.
