South African opposition political parties have long experimented with pre-electoral alliances, many of which have ended unsuccessfully. Against this backdrop, United for Change (UFC), launched by Build One South Africa (BOSA), the GOOD Party and Rise Mzansi in October 2025, represents a fresh attempt to break the cycle. While this alliance aims to contest the 2026 local government elections under a single banner, promising ethical leadership, better services, and a reset of political norms; if South Africa’s political history teaches us anything, it is that pre-electoral alliances, no matter how well-intentioned, rarely succeed in delivering a political alternative. Most of the previous electoral alliances perished in their infancy stages, from the ill-fated Democratic Alliance (DA)-Agang SA experiment, to the short-lived partnership between Patricia de Lille and the DA, to the ultimately stillborn Multi-Party Charter for South Africa.
Political parties in South Africa tend to form alliances on divergent motivations or what is termed marriages of inconvenience
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One of the most instructive cases of pre-election coalitions gone awry was the DA’s merger with the Independent Democrats (ID), led by Patricia de Lille. In 2010, the ID were formally absorbed into the DA, and De Lille became mayor of Cape Town under the DA banner in 2011. However, by 2018, the relationship between De Lille and the DA had broken down acrimoniously, with public disagreements over governance, accountability and race, amongst other issues. Later in 2014, the DA announced a partnership with Agang SA, naming Dr Mamphela Ramphele as its prospective presidential candidate. However, the alliance was short-lived due to disagreements about autonomy, structure and membership.
One of the most recent and largest pre-electoral alliance experiments ahead of the 2024 elections was the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa (MPC), initially called the Moon-shot Pact, which was the brainchild of the DA, and included small opposition parties. Its aim was to contest elections individually, then combine electoral outcomes to form a coalition government on the condition that none of its affiliate members would work with the African National Congress (ANC). One of the main purposes of the MPC was to reduce the electoral majority of the ANC and ultimately dislodge it from power, as it had managed to do so in many of the metropolitan municipalities following the 2016 and 2021 local government elections. However, the tables turned, as the MPC fell short of its goal, as its combined vote share was not enough to dislodge the ANC, and the ANC absorbed the majority of these parties in the Government of National Unity (GNU).
However, the MPC has been undermined by several internal loopholes, divergent ideologies and competing identities. Most damaging was the breach of its own rules on engagement and cooperation with the ANC after the 2024 elections. This electoral and political episode reveals a recurring challenge in South Africa’s opposition landscape; pre-electoral alliances often mask deep ideological divisions and personality driven power struggles, and race-class tensions. The unity becomes tactical, opportunistic rather than transformational. For example, although the opposition collectively secured around 60% of the vote after the 2024 elections, ideological differences, fragmentation, and an unwillingness to compromise on the inclusion of particular political parties, prevented that majority from coalescing into a unified opposition capable of forming a government.
In January 2025, South Africa saw a merger between Forum 4 Service Delivery (F4SD) and ActionSA. According to a joint press statement, the merger was to consolidate opposition parties ahead of the 2026 local government elections. Although this merger was not anticipated, it is however not unprecedented, as smaller political parties often unite to consolidate support and strengthen their electoral chances. F4SD was founded in 2015 as a grassroots civic organisation focused on issues around service delivery problems such as water, sanitation, housing and education in the North West province. F4SD grew into a significant local party holding 38 municipal seats across five provinces and at one point held the mayoral position in a coalition that led the troubled Ditsobotla Local Municipality. Although F4SD contested the 2024 provincial elections in North West, it received less than the required electoral threshold of the votes, falling short of provincial legislature representation.
Both parties are well established in local government. F4SD has a strong grassroots presence, especially in the North West, while ActionSA enjoys significant urban support and performed remarkably well in both the 2021 local government elections with a national outcome of 2.36% of the national ballot cast and in the 2024 general elections. This collaboration is already showing positive results, with ActionSA recently winning its first ward in Ramotshere Moiloa, an ANC stronghold in the former Bophutatswana area. This victory is further strengthened by the fact that ActionSA’s provincial leader in the North West is the son of the late Bophuthatswana homeland leader, Kgosi Lucas Mangope, providing home ground advantage. F4SD President Mbahare Johannes will take up the position of deputy president of ActionSA, with Herman Mashaba as its President. The merger positions the unified party as a stronger, more competitive opposition ahead of the 2026 local government elections, if both parties can maintain the current momentum.
Pre-electoral alliances often fail due to opposition fragmentation and ideological incoherence on policy, race and politics of identity. Political parties in South Africa tend to form alliances on divergent motivations or what is termed marriages of inconvenience. For instance, one of the reasons advanced by the DA for joining the GNU was to prevent the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the MK Party from forming an alliance with the ANC, a scenario the DA referred to as a “doomsday coalition.” On the other hand, both the EFF and the MK Party rejected the offer to join the GNU, citing fundamental ideological differences. The EFF, in particular, objected to the inclusion of the DA and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), both of which it described as right-wing organisations that are fundamentally opposed to the transformation agenda.
The recently launched United for Change, though built on commendable foundational values, such as capable and ethical leadership in local government, basic service delivery and, justice amongst others, risks becoming yet another “new wine in an old skin.” This merger will be governed by a collective leadership model to avoid the infighting that has plagued past opposition alliances. In the 2024 general elections, BOSA, Rise Mzansi, and GOOD collectively secured around 340, 000 votes, earning five seats in the National Assembly (2 each for BOSA and Rise Mzansi, and 1 for GOOD Party). BOSA and Rise Mzansi have yet to establish meaningful grassroots traction at the local government level. This limited local presence poses a key challenge as the three parties prepare to contest the 2026 local government elections under the Unite for Change banner. However, the UFC aims to translate its modest national gains into stronger local impacts, provided it can mobilise structures on the ground and offer an alternative to failing municipalities. Encouragingly, recent Ipsos data indicates that 54% of South Africans support inter-party cooperation at municipal level, signalling public appetite for collaborative governance.
The recently launched United for Change, though built on commendable foundational values, such as capable and ethical leadership in local government, basic service delivery and, justice amongst others, risks becoming yet another “new wine in an old skin.
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The continued presence of these three parties in government and key parliamentary committees, reflects a strategic effort to maximise visibility ahead of the 2026 local government elections. This dual presence across cabinet and parliamentary platforms is enhancing their public political party profiles and legitimacy within the national political discourse. The GNU is a topical issue that has occupied the national political discourse and it only makes sense for parties to position themselves as both participants in governance and custodians of accountability. Their public presence may translate into increased support during the upcoming elections.
Conclusion
South Africa faces a growing problem of political party proliferation, with over 609 registered parties, of which 383 are registered on a national level and a further 226 registered provincially or on a municipal level. In early 2025, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced it would deregister 192 inactive parties. In this context, party mergers like UFC may seem like a step in the right direction. Yet history shows that such alliances frequently collapse due to top-down approaches to the merger, poor consultation, and lack of ideological coherence. Unless new formations like UFC can overcome these structural weaknesses, they risk becoming yet another brief addition to the long list of failed opposition experiments in post-apartheid South Africa.
Boikanyo Nkwatle is a Programme Officer in the Research Unit at ACCORD.
