Mali has just experienced a coup within a coup halfway into an 18-month Transition Government set up following the August 2020 military coup. Interim President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested by the military on 24 May and pressured into resigning, following the announcement of a new “broad-based” government which no longer included two key members of the military junta who had so far occupied the positions of Minister of Defence and Minister of Security. This coup de force only confirmed the growing concerns regarding the intentions of the military junta.
The latest coup plays into the Jihadi narrative presenting an alternative to a discredited state, and violent extremist groups may take advantage of the general confusion in Bamako. @aboutellis
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Despite international condemnation and ECOWAS and the African Union’s decisions to suspend Mali, junta strongman Colonel Assimi Goïta was sworn in as the new transitional president on 7 June. He named Choguel Maïga as the country’s new civilian Prime Minister, marking the entry of the Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques (M5-RFP) into the transition government. The M5-RFP, a diverse and at times divided coalition of parties and associations that had led the protests against former President IBK prior to the 2020 coup had till now refused to participate in the transition under the conditions imposed by the junta.
This new Malian political reality raises many questions over the respect of the transition calendar due to end with presidential and legislative elections in February 2022, but also over the future of the peace process, and the future of the French counterterrorism operation Barkhane.
In an unexpected move, France temporarily suspended joint military operations with Malian forces in early June, a few days only after President Emmanuel Macron warned in an interview to a French newspaper that he could pull out troops from Mali if the country goes in the direction of “radical Islamism” and that he would “not remain alongside a country where there is neither democratic legitimacy nor transition.” This comes in a context of the questioning of the future of the French regional military operations – after president Macron, up for re-election in April 2022, called for a ‘civilian surge’ – and of the Joint Force G5 Sahel (JF-G5S) – following the death of Chadian president Idriss Déby Itno in April.
The future of the Malian peace process is once again being called into question. The implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement remains painfully slow. Political will is lacking from all sides but the new transition leadership nonetheless quickly tried to reassure the signatory armed movements – and the international community – concerned about Choguel Maïga’s known aversion to the Peace Agreement. Yet, signatory armed movements have not disarmed, and seem to have found a modus vivendi going about their affairs largely unchallenged in northern Mali, where state presence remains minimal, and attacks on a more resilient MINUSMA continue.
Beyond the strategic priorities, the Security Council may wish to strengthen the language in MINUSMA’s mandate on both the promotion and protection of human rights and accountability @aboutellis
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Short of a more forceful and concerted role by the Algeria-led international mediation to focus the parties’ attention on key priorities and hold them accountable, meaningful progress is unlikely. The Constitutional reform, which presents a unique opportunity to ‘lock in’ some of the core political-institutional provisions from the Algiers Agreement but also to address structural and governance deficiencies that have fed cycles of crises into the future Malian Constitution, is also more uncertain than ever.
Although violence has decreased in Central Mali since last autumn largely due to the brokering of local agreements of different sorts – some mediated including by MINUSMA but others imposed onto communities tired of the violence and displacements -, insecurity continues to spread further to the South of Mali. Despite unique challenges to implementing a Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate in a context of violent extremism, MINUSMA has made progress in its Adaptation Plan and in delivering integrated civilian-military actions, including through the deployment of temporary operating bases (TOB). The lack of clear Malian national vision for the Centre however remains a major limitation, and the latest coup plays into the Jihadi narrative presenting an alternative to a discredited state, and violent extremist groups may take advantage of the general confusion in Bamako.
As the UN Security Council prepares to discuss MINUSMA, there is a general consensus that the two strategic priorities of the mandate should remain to support the implementation of the Algiers Agreement by the Malian parties and to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive politically led Malian strategy to protect civilians and re-establish State authority in Central Mali.
The main issues for discussion will be how to carry out these priorities more effectively and how to best add to the mandate elements required to support an uncertain Malian Transition while managing associated risks and without diverting limited resources away from the first two strategic priorities. Council members may notably want to make good use of concrete benchmarks to keep pressure on the Transition Government to respect the timetable for elections and to advance the peace process notably by translating key provisions from the agreement into a new Constitution that would result from a consultative and inclusive process.
Beyond the strategic priorities, the Security Council may wish to strengthen the language in MINUSMA’s mandate on both the promotion and protection of human rights and accountability. It may also wish to emphasize the importance of a more people-centred approach to the mission’s support to stabilisation and reestablishment of state authority. Given the strong counter-currents facing women’s participation and rights, it may be necessary to also keep the pressure on Malian parties including towards the effective operationalization of the Women’s Observatory.
With that said, many of the challenges the UN mission in Mali is facing (such as the need for better strategic and operational integration between civilian components and the Force; and clarified relationships to other forces operating in Mali) will however not be resolved by an adjusted mandate alone. But a clearer strategic direction from MINUSMA’s new leadership strongly backed by a unified Security Council willing to hold Malians accountable can certainly help.
Arthur Boutellis is a Non-resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute. Read the EPON report here.
