For African states, sovereignty has never been a merely legal abstraction. It was hard-won through decades of anti-colonial struggle and remains central to the continent’s experience of international order. Yet that order is now visibly fraying. Across the continent, sovereignty is increasingly invoked selectively, respected or violated for strategic convenience. This pattern extends beyond Africa. In early January 2026, the United States (US) launched a military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Days later, US President Donald Trump alluded to the possibility of using force to acquire Greenland. These events, in a troubling evolution of sovereignty norms, pose a significant threat to African states.
In the decades following decolonisation, sovereignty held profound significance for African states, as it represented states’ newfound political autonomy and freedom from colonialism and general unwarranted external influence. As a result, sovereignty and the principle of non-interference were deeply respected and were even institutionalised in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter. African diplomacy was crucial in further developing and strengthening sovereignty norms during this period. However, this interpretation of sovereignty was not without its issues. For example, these principles restricted the OAU’s capacity to intervene in conflicts on the continent. Additionally, in cases of mass atrocity, most notably the Rwandan genocide in 1994, respect for sovereignty translated into devastating inaction amongst the international community.
It was against this backdrop that the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) emerged in the early 2000s. Rather than abandoning sovereignty, R2P sought to reinterpret it. Sovereignty was reframed as responsibility, and was no longer absolute, but rather conditional upon a state fulfilling its primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. If a state failed in this duty, the international community could intervene. The concept was widely endorsed during the United Nations (UN) World Summit in 2005. Similarly, African voices were again at the forefront of this evolution, with the African Union (AU) explicitly rejecting the principle of ‘non-interference’ in favour of ‘non-indifference’ to mass atrocities.
However, this new iteration of sovereignty had its own problems. This can be seen most starkly in the Libyan crisis in 2011. When former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s government began to crack down on rebel and civilian protests, the UN Security Council authorised military intervention under the auspices of the R2P. This intervention was led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is considered by some to have been an operation intended to topple the Libyan regime rather than simply providing humanitarian protection. The AU, which had proposed alternative solutions, vehemently opposed this option.
In the aftermath of the Libyan intervention, many African countries, as well as most of the Global South, returned to the idea that sovereignty should provide states with protection, determined to prevent future interventions in the name of humanitarianism. However, this attempted return to sovereignty has proven hollow, as it is no longer consistently upheld. What has emerged instead is an understanding of sovereignty as something to invoke when convenient and violate when it serves states’ strategic interests, with limited and often no attempt to justify such actions in humanitarian terms. Contemporary Africa illustrates this pattern. For example, in post-2011 Libya, Egypt, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia have supported competing factions in Libya in pursuit of energy access, regional influence and migration control. These interventions make no. or only limited, pretence of humanitarian concern.
In the aftermath of the Libyan intervention, many African countries, as well as most of the Global South, returned to the idea that sovereignty should provide states with protection, determined to prevent future interventions in the name of humanitarianism
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Similarly, decisions over recognition of sovereignty are made by states based on strategic calculations rather than legal principles or local realities. In December 2020, for example, the US recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as part of a deal seeking to strengthen Morocco’s diplomatic relations with Israel. This recognition went against previous US policy as well as the UN’s stance on the issue. Somalilandpresents a similar case. The issue of sovereignty over the territory has remained unresolved for three decades, receiving limited international attention or engagement. The issue only gained attention when Israel expressed interest in relations with Somaliland in 2025, as it was suddenly framed as an issue of Red Sea security.
Somaliland’s coastline overlooks the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, connecting Africa, Asia and Europe, through which a large share of the world’s trade passes. Somaliland’s access to this corridor, as well as the state’s ability to establish a military presence there, is of considerable strategic value. This explains why Somaliland’s longstanding sovereignty dispute has suddenly attracted international attention, particularly when coupled with the increased geopolitical competition in the region.
Some may, validly, argue that sovereignty has always been selectively applied. What has changed, however, is the abandonment of even the pretence of a principled framework. During the R2P era, violations of sovereignty at least required justification in humanitarian terms. Today, that expectation has largely dissolved. Interventions in Libya, the selective recognition of Western Saharan sovereignty, and the instrumentalisation of Somaliland’s status are not defended on humanitarian grounds; they are simply enacted. This evolution therefore represents not progress but regression: the loss of a normative architecture that, while imperfect, at least created a basis for accountability. Moreover, the consequences of this regression are unevenly distributed. For Africa, this is not a theoretical concern. Africa has been central to the moral failures that resulted in the development of the R2P doctrine, the experimentation in its application that followed and now the consequences of its erosion.
Trump’s operation against Venezuela is shocking not because it is new, but because it shows openly what the international community has been practicing quietly in Africa for years. Until powerful states face meaningful consequences for violating sovereignty, and humanitarian principles are applied consistently rather than selectively, African states will have to continue navigating an international system in which restraint is optional, protection is selective and accountability is not guaranteed.
Until powerful states face meaningful consequences for violating sovereignty, and humanitarian principles are applied consistently rather than selectively, African states will have to continue navigating an international system in which restraint is optional, protection is selective and accountability is not guaranteed
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Xanthe Gittings is a research intern at ACCORD, focusing on peace, security and African regional affairs.
