Like so many others around the world at the start of this year, I and members of the UN family watched with alarm the growing spread and impact of COVID-19 in Somalia and elsewhere in the world. Our biggest worry was the potential for the pandemic to spiral out of control. Somalia is rebuilding after three decades of conflict, protracted crises and repeated humanitarian emergencies. Continued insecurity makes parts of the country inaccessible to humanitarian workers.
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) was first reported in the Horn of Africa region in early March 2020. At first, the number of cases seemed low compared to other regions, both on the continent and around the globe; however, these figures did increase steadily. Six months into the pandemic, it is encouraging to note the downward trend in the number of cases and deaths over the past few weeks. Thus far, more than 150,000 cases have been reported in the Horn of Africa; however, testing capacity is still quite limited, making the numbers a poor indicator of the actual infection rate. As pointed out by Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), both the drastic preventative measures applied across Africa by governments in the first months of the pandemic and the continent’s young population certainly played a significant role in limiting the devastating impact of the virus, as seen elsewhere. Regional and international efforts have also helped in hampering the immediate impact of the pandemic, but a sustained and coordinated effort is needed to reduce the longer-term effects of COVID-19, particularly the effects on public health and the economy.
The escalation of the COVID-19 pandemic across Africa, which began in March 2020, has gravely affected how the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) undertakes its operations. Given the multifaceted mandates of AMISOM, which include undertaking activities requiring close-quarters congregations and contact with Somali stakeholders, a balance has to be struck on how to continually discharge these mandates without putting the lives of its personnel and that of the Somali community in jeopardy.
The African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) were scheduled to adopt a new strategic partnership agreement at an AU–EU summit in October, but it had to be postponed due to COVID-19 risks and related delays. This may be a blessing in disguise, as it gives the negotiators more time to adapt the relationship to COVID-19 and to craft an agreement that expands the focus, scope and scale of African–European relations for the next two decades.
By 7 October 2020, African countries will have been managing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic for approximately 29 weeks. While the rate of infections and deaths has been high in many countries in other parts of the world, this has not been particularly so for Africa. Apart from South Africa, which is among the top 10 countries with the highest infection rate, the reported rate of infections and deaths has been low in many other African countries. Early precautionary measures were taken, before many (in some countries any) infections and deaths. This strategy seems to have been effective at containing the virus, but it compromised livelihoods, thus exacerbating existing socio-economic and political vulnerabilities.
Africa has responded swiftly to the COVID-19 pandemic and, as of now, reported cases are lower than early pessimistic estimates. It is too early to know the full impact of COVID-19 on Africa. To date, the experience has been varied. Moreover, as with other regions, there is not one homogenous narrative around the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. The pandemic is affecting African countries differently, given varied strengths and vulnerabilities. There are causes for concern, but also reasons for hope. Much hangs in the balance. Vigilance and preparedness are critical.
When the COVID-19 outbreak began to emerge as a global crisis, countries around the world were forced to react and prepare for a potential outbreak within their borders. For many, closing their borders was an immediate solution, but for Uganda, it was a measure to buy time for a public health approach composed of multisector strategies that had proven successful time and time again in the country’s response to epidemics.
There is an important need for relevant stakeholders to adopt strategies aimed at reaching out to farming and pastoralist communities, if the fight for the mitigation and possible eradication of the COVID-19 pandemic is to have any meaningful effect.
COVID-19 has affected all sectors of Malian society, especially the security, economic and social dimensions. In terms of security, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have enabled jihadists to firmly re-establish themselves in central Mali and to make new inroads towards the west of the country. Economically and socially, COVID-19 and the measures introduced to prevent it have severely disrupted the lives of many people in Mali.
Despite its obvious limits and constraints, the African Union (AU) has been doing its utmost to address peace and security challenges in Africa. However, over the past few years, the involvement of external powers has drastically increased at the expense of seeking African solutions to African problems. This trend has deepened during the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent reduction of meetings, field visits and peace initiatives by the AU.
Since independence, the Republic of Mali has been faced with situations of political, institutional and security instability. Although the state of governance in Mali is weak and fragile, and is now under further pressure from COVID-19, it has adopted several policies and programmes to advance the youth and engage in the future development of the country. However, these initiatives do not address the specific needs of young women.
Long before the arrival of COVID-19, the Sahel and West Africa were two particular regions in Africa that were confronted by many complex and interrelated security and humanitarian challenges. From violent conflict to famine and other humanitarian difficulties, the spread of COVID-19 is magnifying the threats to the region’s most vulnerable populations. Arguably, the most challenging of these issues are the toxic atmosphere and insecurity created as a result of the activities of armed violent extremist groups.
More than one year after the signing of the landmark Constitutional Declaration, Sudan’s ongoing transition remains one of the most important political transformations on the African continent. The country’s transition is fluid and complex, and undeniable areas of progress and reform continue to come up against deeply entrenched interests and inequalities, which have been compounded by COVID-19.
Following the remarkable changes brought on by the peaceful revolution in Sudan in 2019, 2020 was set to be a year during which the country could make great strides in delivering on the aspirations of the Sudanese people for change after 30 years of autocratic rule. The sudden arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic thus fell cruelly at a critical moment, with the country having just embarked on its make-or-break transition towards a civilian-led democracy.
The COVID-19 pandemic is directly and indirectly affecting governments’ ability to secure their populations. This is also the case of the core Sahel countries – which, in this brief, are defined as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Officially, none of them have been severely affected by the pandemic. However, this does not mean that COVID-19 effects could not materialise. The effects of COVID-19 will come, and while they may mainly be indirect, the consequences could be an additional burden on political and social systems that are already close to the brink.
For several years, the Sahel has been facing insecurity. Niger, by virtue of its geographical position, is the Sahel country most affected by this insecurity, due to persistent attacks by non-state armed groups in its western region bordering Burkina Faso and Mali, and in its eastern region (the Lake Chad Basin), where Boko Haram is active. In addition to this, there is now the added threat of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Sahel’s stability and prosperity has been seriously challenged in recent years. The prevalence of intercommunal violence, climate change and food insecurity, among other factors, contribute to the region’s instability. These have been further fuelled by additional extenuating factors that include limitations in economic development, poor development in health and human welfare, and now the COVID-19 pandemic.
When the first COVID-19 cases reached the African continent, early estimates painted a dim picture of the impact of the pandemic on the region. Editorialists, public figures and think tanks predicted a widespread outbreak in the face of governments and health systems lacking the capacities to counter it. On 9 March 2020, the first two cases of COVID-19 were announced in Burkina Faso, followed by Niger on 19 March and Mali on 25 March. The outlook for the Sahel was particularly pessimistic. Some predicted that in addition to the human toll, the pandemic would spark the collapse of the Sahelian states.