The African Standby Force (ASF) was established as a key component of the African Union’s (AU’s) strategy to address conflicts across the continent. Despite over two decades of development, the ASF has yet to be deployed in any mission, highlighting significant challenges in its institutional and operational readiness. The current crisis in Sudan underscores the urgency for the ASF to evolve into a more agile and responsive mechanism capable of addressing complex conflicts across the continent.
Reforming the ASF to achieve full operational readiness for crises like Sudan
The ASF was conceived as a cornerstone of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), designed to enable rapid and effective responses to continental crises. However, its operationalisation has been hampered by systemic challenges, particularly in contexts such as Sudan, where complex conflicts demand swift and coordinated action. The AU Chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, has prioritised making the ASF fully operational as part of broader reforms to enhance Africa’s crisis response capabilities. However, the ASF’s original assumptions—such as rapid deployment under the authority of AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)—have not materialised due to political, logistical, and doctrinal inefficiencies.
The AU Chairperson, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, has prioritised making the ASF fully operational as part of broader reforms to enhance Africa’s crisis response capabilities
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A central issue is the lack of political cohesion between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The ASF’s structure relies on regional brigades, but RECs like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) often prioritise autonomous deployments over AU-led coordination. For instance, ECOWAS has historically resisted ceding control over interventions within its jurisdiction, as is seen in its unilateral decision-making during the Gambia crisis in 2017, which sidelined the ASF framework. Similarly, the SADC mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed in 2021 without full integration into the ASF’s command structure, reflecting a preference for regional ownership over continental unity. This fragmentation undermines the ASF’s ability to function as a unified force, particularly in cross-border crises like Sudan, where regional rivalries and competing interests further complicate collective action.
Logistical shortcomings also cripple the ASF’s readiness. The Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon, established in 2018, remains underutilised due to incomplete Regional Logistics Depots (RLDs) and inadequate strategic airlift capabilities. For example, during the 2023 Sudan crisis, the ASF’s inability to rapidly deploy troops highlighted gaps in transportation and supply chains, forcing reliance on ad hoc coalitions like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The AU’s reliance on external partners for airlift support—such as the European Union’s (EU’s) limited contributions—exposes vulnerabilities in self-sufficiency, a critical flaw for a force aspiring to “Silence the Guns.”
Doctrinally, the ASF struggles to adapt to evolving security threats, such as terrorism and hybrid conflicts. Originally designed for traditional peacekeeping (e.g., observer missions or Chapter VI interventions), the ASF lacks specialised units for counter-terrorism, despite the PSC’s 2020 decision to establish such a capability. The rise of groups like the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which blend militia violence with political insurgency, demands a reconfiguration of ASF mandates to include robust peace enforcement and stabilisation roles. The AU’s reliance on outdated mission scenarios (e.g., Scenario 4 for peacekeeping) further limits its relevance in Sudan-like crises, where spoilers reject political settlements.
To achieve full operational readiness, the ASF must overhaul its governance and financing models. The 2024 Algiers consultative meetings proposed a “just-in-time” coalition approach, replacing rigid standby brigades with flexible, context-specific forces. This could mirror the ad hoc success of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, where regional states pooled resources under a shared mandate. Additionally, leveraging United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 (2023) for predictable funding—while safeguarding African agency—could address budget shortfalls, though risks of UN micromanagement remain, as seen in the contentious AMISOM-ATMIS (AU Mission in Somalia-AU Transition Mission in Somalia) transition.
The ASF’s reform must prioritise political harmonisation, logistical investment, and doctrinal agility to address crises like Sudan. Without these steps, the force risks becoming a symbolic rather than operational tool, perpetuating Africa’s reliance on fragmented and unsustainable ad hoc interventions.
Funding constraints and the feasibility of AU-led missions in Sudan
The AU’s ability to deploy effective peace operations in Sudan is severely constrained by funding shortages, exacerbated by the United States’ (US) retreat from UN peacekeeping financing. Historically, the US contributed 26.95% of the UN’s peacekeeping budget, but recent political shifts—including proposals to defund UN missions altogether—threaten even this baseline support. This withdrawal has direct consequences for AU missions like ATMIS in Somalia, which relied heavily on UN-assessed contributions, and signals a broader trend of dwindling resources for African-led operations. The AU’s 2023 Peace Fund, designed to cover 25% of mission costs, is insufficient to bridge this gap, leaving large-scale deployments like the ASF financially unviable in complex crises like Sudan.
Cost-effective alternatives are now imperative. The AU’s past experiences in Darfur underscore the limitations of underfunded interventions. The hybrid UN-AU mission (UNAMID) was hobbled by logistical shortfalls and political compromises, ultimately failing to stem violence despite a US$1 billion annual budget. In Sudan’s current conflict, a lean, unarmed observer mission—focused on ceasefire monitoring rather than enforcement—may be the only feasible option. Such a model aligns with the AU’s recent pivot toward “just-in-time” coalitions and lighter footprints, as seen in the IGAD-led monitoring efforts in South Sudan. However, even this approach faces hurdles: the AU’s 2024 Ad Hoc Presidential Committee for Sudan lacks a clear budget, and regional actors like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are prioritising bilateral initiatives over collective AU mechanisms.
Innovative financing mechanisms offer partial solutions. UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) theoretically enables UN funding for AU-led missions, but its implementation remains fraught with conditions. The resolution mandates UNSC authorisation for each deployment, effectively subordinating AU decision-making to geopolitical rivalries—a hurdle evident in the Security Council’s deadlock over Sudan. Meanwhile, partnerships with the EU and Gulf states are unreliable. The EU’s €1.9 billion African Peace Facility is primarily allocated to Sahel counterterrorism, while Gulf donors like the UAE have channelled resources to proxy forces in Sudan rather than impartial peace processes. The AU’s inability to secure sustainable funding mirrors broader systemic issues: as of 2025, only 12% of the AU’s budget is member-funded, leaving it dependent on volatile external donors.
The implications for Sudan are dire. Without robust funding, the ASF’s role will likely be reduced to symbolic gestures, such as ceasefire verification teams reliant on regional actors like IGAD or the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). This fragmentation is already visible: IGAD’s Sudan mediation efforts are undercut by competing initiatives from Egypt and the AU’s own poorly coordinated High-Level Panel and Ad Hoc Committee. Moreover, the RSF and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have exploited this disarray, “forum-shopping” among mediators to avoid binding commitments while continuing military campaigns. The AU’s insistence on prioritising political solutions—such as its Roadmap for Sudan—rings hollow without the financial leverage to incentivise compliance.
The AU’s insistence on prioritising political solutions—such as its Roadmap for Sudan—rings hollow without the financial leverage to incentivise compliance.
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Ultimately, the funding crisis demands a paradigm shift in AU peacekeeping. The ASF’s traditional model, designed for rapid military deployments, is ill-suited to fiscal austerity. Instead, the AU must embrace modular approaches: combining unarmed observers with targeted sanctions (e.g., leveraging the US “Gold for Oil” Sudan sanctions) and hybrid financing models that blend UN, EU, and limited Gulf support. The alternative—persisting with unfunded ambitions—risks irrelevance as Sudan’s war spirals into a regional humanitarian catastrophe. The ASF’s relevance in Sudan hinges on operational adaptability and sustainable financing. Reforms must address political bottlenecks and funding shortfalls to enable even limited deployments, such as observer missions, while advancing the AU’s broader peacekeeping vision.
Abraham Ename Minko is a senior researcher and policy analyst in peace, security, and conflict resolution.
